Export taxes under Bertrand duopoly by Clarke, Roger et al.
Cardiff Economics
Working Papers
Roger Clarke and David R. Collie
Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly
E2006/15
CARDIFF BUSINESS SCHOOL
WORKING PAPER SERIES
This working paper is produced for discussion purpose only. These working papers are expected to be published in
due course, in revised form, and should not be quoted or cited without the author’s written permission.
Cardiff Economics Working Papers are available online from: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/econ/workingpapers
Enquiries: EconWP@cardiff.ac.uk
ISSN 1749-6101
February 2006
Cardiff Business School
Cardiff University
Colum Drive
Cardiff CF10 3EU
United Kingdom
t: +44 (0)29 2087 4000
f: +44 (0)29 2087 4419
www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs
 Address for correspondence: Professor David Collie, Cardiff Business School, Aberconway Building, 
Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU, United Kingdom. Tel: +44 29 2087 6815. 
E-mail: Collie@cardiff.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly 
Roger Clarke and David R. Collie 
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product 
differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country 
market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the 
optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the 
country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results 
under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is 
shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot 
duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly. 
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1. Introduction 
The extensive literature on international trade and trade policy under imperfect 
competition has concentrated upon the Cournot duopoly model and paid relatively little 
attention to the Bertrand duopoly model with a few exceptions such as Eaton and Grossman 
(1986) and Cheng (1988). Recently, Clarke and Collie (2003) analysed the welfare effects of 
free trade in the Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation. In contrast to the 
results of Brander and Krugman (1983) under Cournot duopoly, they showed that there were 
always gains from trade under Bertrand duopoly. They used the same model to analyse 
import tariffs in Clarke and Collie (2006), where they showed that the optimum-welfare tariff 
may exceed the maximum-revenue tariff under Bertrand duopoly, as Collie (1991) showed 
for Cournot duopoly, in contrast to the result of Johnson (1951-52) under perfect competition. 
They also showed that the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff were 
lower under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly. Similarly, Cheng (1988) shows 
that the optimal import tariff and production subsidy are lower under Bertrand duopoly than 
under Cournot duopoly. This suggests that a general principle might be that the incentive to 
intervene in international trade is greater under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand 
duopoly. 
Regarding trade policy for export industries, Brander and Spencer (1985) showed that an 
export subsidy was optimal under Cournot duopoly whereas Eaton and Grossman (1986) 
showed that an export tax was optimal under Bertarnd duopoly. In the Brander and Spencer 
(1985) model, de Meza (1986) showed that the country with the lowest cost firm will give the 
largest export subsidy in the Nash equilibrium in export subsidies. This result was generalised 
by Collie and de Meza (2003) to allow for the possibility of export taxes and/or export 
subsidies in the Nash equilibrium under Cournot duopoly. They showed that the absolute 
value of export subsidy or tax of the country with the lowest cost firm will be larger than the 
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absolute value of the export subsidy or tax of the other country. This suggests another general 
principle might be that the country with the lowest cost firm will have the greatest incentive 
to intervene in international trade compared to the other country. 
This note will analyse export taxes under Bertrand duopoly using the same model as 
Clarke and Collie (2003 and 2006) in order to answer a number of questions. Firstly, how do 
the maximum-revenue and optimum-welfare export taxes under Bertrand duopoly compare 
with those under Cournot duopoly? Secondly, is it possible for the optimum-welfare export 
tax to exceed the maximum-revenue export tax as Clarke and Collie (2006) showed may 
happen with import tariffs? Thirdly, in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes as in Eaton and 
Grossman (1986), will the country with the lowest cost firm impose the largest export tax in 
line with the proposition of Collie and de Meza (2003) under Cournot duopoly? 
The Bertrand duopoly model is presented in section two then the maximum-revenue and 
optimum-welfare export taxes are derived and compared in section three. The Nash 
equilibrium in export taxes is derived in section four and the conclusions are given in section 
five. For comparison, the Cournot duopoly model with product differentiation is analysed in 
the appendix. 
 
2. The Model 
As in Clarke and Collie (2003 and 2006), assume that there are two countries, a home 
and a foreign country and that each country has one firm that produces a differentiated good, 
with the home firm labelled as firm one and the foreign firm labelled as firm two.1 The two 
firms both export to a third-country market where they compete in a Bertrand duopoly. 
Markets are assumed to be segmented. The home firm has constant marginal cost 1c , sets 
                                                 
1 A similar model is used by Kikuchi (1998) to analyse optimum-welfare export taxes and subsidies 
under Bertrand and Cournot duopoly. He assumes symmetric demand functions and does not consider the 
maximum-revenue export tax or the Nash equilibrium in export taxes. 
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price 1p , and sells output 1y  while the foreign firm has constant marginal cost 2c , sets price 
2p , and sells output 2y . The government in the home (foreign) country imposes a specific 
export tax of 1e ( 2e ) per unit exported by the home (foreign) firm. It is assumed that there is a 
representative consumer in the third-country market with quasi-linear preferences that can be 
represented by a quadratic utility function, as in Vives (1985): 
 
2 2
2
1 2
1 1
1( , ) , , 0;
2i i i i i i ii i
U z y y y y zα β γ α β γ β γ
= =
= − − + > >∑ ∑y  (1) 
where z  is consumption of a numeraire good and 2 1 20 1γ β β< <  is a measure of the degree 
of product substitutability ranging from zero when the products are independent to one when 
they are perfect substitutes. It is straightforward to show that the utility function (1) yields the 
following inverse and direct demand functions: 
 ( ) , 1,21
i i i i j
i i j j j i j
p y y
i j i j
y p p
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α β α γ β γ
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where 21 2 0F β β γ= − > . With segmented markets and constant marginal costs, the third-
country export market can be analysed independently of the home and foreign markets. Then, 
the profit functions of the home firm and the foreign firm from exports to the third-country 
market are: 
 ( ) 1,2i i i i ip c e y iπ = − − =  (3) 
Assuming an interior solution, where both firms export positive quantities to the third-
country market, it is straightforward to solve for the Bertrand equilibrium prices: 
 1 ( ) ( )i i i i i i i j j jp c e G c e c eH
α β γ α⎡ ⎤= + + − − − − −⎣ ⎦  (4) 
where 21 22 0G β β γ= − >  and 21 24 0H β β γ= − > . Substituting these prices into the demand 
functions (2) yields the Bertrand equilibrium exports of the home firm and the foreign firm: 
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 ( ) ( )ji i i i i j j jy G c e c eFHβ α β γ α⎡ ⎤= − − − − −⎣ ⎦  (5) 
As with (4) and (5), many of the results that follow will be functions of ( )1 1cα −  and 
( )2 2cα −  so it is worth noting that iα  is the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay for the 
product of the ith firm while ic  is the marginal cost of the ith firm. Also, from (4) and (5), it 
can be seen that an increase in the export tax of the home country results in both firms 
increasing their prices, a decrease in exports for the home firm, and an increase in exports for 
the foreign firm. These results can now be used to derive the maximum-revenue and the 
optimum-welfare export taxes. 
 
3. Optimum-Welfare and Maximum-Revenue Export Taxes 
This section analyses the trade policy of the home country and, for simplicity, it will be 
assumed that the foreign country pursues a policy of laissez-faire so 2 0e =  throughout this 
section. Firstly, consider the maximum-revenue export tax of the home country. The 
maximum-revenue export tax is the export tax that maximises the export tax revenue 
collected by the government in the home country. The export tax is 1e  per unit of exports and 
the quantity of exports is 1y  so export tax revenue is 1 1 1R e y= . Assuming an interior solution 
where the market is supplied by exports from both firms, the first-order condition for the 
maximisation of export tax revenue by the government in the home country is: 
 1 11 1
1 1
0R yy e
e e
∂ ∂= + =∂ ∂  (6) 
Thus, using (5), to solve for an explicit expression for the maximum-revenue export tax 
yields (where the superscript B is used to denote the Bertrand duopoly and R is used to denote 
the maximum-revenue export tax): 
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 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 2 2
2
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2
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G
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Clearly, the maximum-revenue export tax must be positive if there are any exports, 
1 0y > , which implies that the expression in square brackets must be positive if there are any 
exports. The maximum-revenue export tax is decreasing in the costs of the home firm and 
increasing in the costs of the foreign firm. 
To compare the maximum-revenue export tax under Bertrand duopoly with that under 
Cournot duopoly, subtract (7) from the corresponding equation under Cournot duopoly (A3) 
in the Appendix, which yields: 
 ( )31 1 2 2
2
0
4
CR BRe e c
G
γ αβ− = − >  (8) 
This is clearly positive, which leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The maximum-revenue export tax is always lower under Bertrand 
duopoly than under Cournot duopoly. 
An export tax causes a larger reduction in exports under Bertrand duopoly than under 
Cournot duopoly so the maximum-revenue export tax is lower under Bertrand duopoly than 
under Cournot duopoly. Clarke and Collie (2006) obtain the same result for the maximum-
revenue import tariff. 
Now consider the optimum-welfare export tax of the home country. The optimum-
welfare export tax is the export tax that maximises the welfare of the home country, where 
the welfare of the home country is given by the sum of the profits of the home firm and 
export tax revenue: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1W R p c e y e y p c yπ= + = − + + = −  (9) 
Thus, assuming an interior solution where both firms export to the third-country market, 
the first-order condition for welfare maximisation by the government of the home country is: 
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The effect of the export tax on welfare can be decomposed in two different ways. Firstly, 
the export tax has an effect on the profits of the home firm and an effect on the tax revenue of 
the government, which is positive for low export taxes but will become negative for high 
export taxes. Secondly, it can be decomposed into the usual profit-shifting effect, which is 
negative, and the terms of trade effect, which is positive. 
Using (4) and (5) to solve (10) for an explicit solution for the optimum-welfare export 
tax yields (where the superscript W is used to denote the optimum-welfare export tax): 
 ( ) ( )2 21 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 1 2
0
4
BW Fe y G c c
G G
γ γ α β γ αβ β β= = − − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (11) 
Clearly, as shown by Eaton and Grossman (1986), the optimum-welfare export tax is 
positive under Bertrand duopoly if there are any exports, 1 0y > , which implies that the 
expression in square brackets is positive. As in Kikuchi (1998), the optimum-welfare export 
tax is decreasing in the marginal cost of the firm in the home country. 
Brander and Spencer (1985) have shown that the optimum-welfare export tax is negative 
(an export subsidy) under Cournot duopoly. Therefore, to compare the two policies, the 
absolute value of the optimum-welfare export tax under Bertrand duopoly will be compared 
with the absolute value of the export subsidy under Cournot duopoly. Using (11) and the 
corresponding equation under Cournot duopoly (A4) from the Appendix yields: 
 ( )41 1 1 1 04CW BWe e cG
γ αββ− = − >  (12) 
This is clearly positive, which leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: The absolute value of the optimum-welfare export tax under Bertrand 
duopoly is lower than the absolute value of the export subsidy under Cournot duopoly. 
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Although the optimal policy is an export tax under Bertrand duopoly and an export 
subsidy under Cournot duopoly, the comparison of the absolute values of the policies shows 
the export subsidy under Cournot duopoly is larger than the export tax under Bertrand 
duopoly. Clarke and Collie (2006) obtain the same result for the optimum-welfare import 
tariff except that it is positive under both Bertrand and Cournot duopoly. This suggests a 
general result that the incentive to intervene in international trade is greater under Cournot 
duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly. 
To compare the optimum-welfare export tax with the maximum-revenue export tax 
under Bertrand duopoly, subtract (7) from (11), which yields: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 2
1 0
4
BR BWe e G c cα β γ αβ β− = − − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (13) 
This is clearly positive, which leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: The maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare 
export tax under Bertrand duopoly. 
The export tax always reduces the profits of the home firm so the first-order condition 
for welfare maximisation (10) implies that the export tax revenue must be increasing at the 
optimum-welfare export tax so it must be lower than maximum-revenue export tax. This 
result is in contrast to the result in Clarke and Collie (2006) that the optimum-welfare import 
tariff may exceed the maximum-revenue import tariff under Bertrand duopoly. The 
explanation for the difference is that an import tariff has a positive profit-shifting effect but 
an export tax has a negative profit-shifting effect. 
 
4. Nash Equilibrium Export Taxes 
This section considers the Nash equilibrium in export taxes when both governments use 
export taxes and they are both maximising their own welfare. Since the objective is to analyse 
how the Nash equilibrium export taxes depend upon the relative costs of the firms, it will be 
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assumed that the demand functions are symmetric so that the cost comparisons are 
meaningful; thus, 1 2β β β= =  and 1 2α α α= = . The welfare of the home country is defined 
by (9) and the welfare of the foreign country is defined analogously. Therefore, the first-order 
conditions for the Nash equilibrium in export taxes are: 
 ( ) 0 1,2i i ii i i
i i i
W y pp c y i
e e e
∂ ∂ ∂= − + = =∂ ∂ ∂  (14) 
Solving (14) using (4) and (5) yields the Nash equilibrium export taxes of the two 
countries (where the superscript N is used to denote the Nash equilibrium): 
 ( )( ) ( )( )2 2 2 2 2 24 3 0BNi i i i j jFe y c c i jGγ γ β β γ α γ β γ αβ ⎡ ⎤= = − − − − − > ≠⎣ ⎦∆  (15) 
where ( )4 2 2 416 12 0β β β γ γ∆ ≡ − + > . The Nash equilibrium export taxes are positive if both 
firms export positive quantities to the third-country market, which implies that the expression 
in square brackets is positive. Using (15) to compare the Nash equilibrium export taxes of the 
two countries yields: 
 ( )( ) ( )
2
1 2 2 12 24 2
BN BNe e c c
γ β γ
β β βγ γ
+− = −+ −  (16) 
If the home firm has the lowest costs, 1 2c c< , then the government in the home country 
will impose the largest export tax, 1 2
BN BNe e>  and vice versa. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 4: The country with the lowest cost firm imposes the largest export tax in the 
Nash equilibrium in export taxes under Bertrand duopoly. 
This result is consistent with the proposition of Collie and de Meza (2003) that the 
country with the lowest cost firm would give the largest export subsidy or tax in absolute 
terms under Cournot duopoly. The country with the lowest cost firm intervenes most in 
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international trade whether it uses an export tax under Bertrand duopoly or an export subsidy 
under Cournot duopoly. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Firstly this article has derived the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare 
export tax in the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products and, for comparison, in 
the Cournot duopoly model with differentiated products. It was shown that the maximum-
revenue export tax was lower under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly. The 
absolute value of the optimum-welfare export tax under Bertrand duopoly was shown to be 
lower than the absolute value of the export subsidy under Cournot duopoly. These results are 
in line with the findings of Cheng (1988) and Clarke and Collie (2006) for import tariffs and 
support the general principle that the incentive for governments to intervene in international 
trade is greater under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly. 
Secondly, it was shown that the maximum-revenue export tax will always exceed the 
optimum-welfare export tax under both Bertrand and Cournot duopoly. This result is in line 
with the result of Johnson (1951-52) under perfect competition, but contrasts with the result 
of Collie (1991) and Clarke and Collie (2006) for import tariffs under both Cournot and 
Bertrand duopoly. Clarke and Collie (2006) showed that the optimum-welfare tariff may 
exceed the maximum-revenue tariff under both Bertrand and Cournot duopoly. The reason 
for the difference in the results for an export tax and an import tariff is that the profit-shifting 
effect of an import tariff is positive whereas the profit-shifting effect of an export tax is 
negative. 
Thirdly, this note derived the Nash-equilibrium in export taxes under Bertrand duopoly 
and showed that the country with the lowest cost firm will impose the largest export tax in the 
Nash equilibrium. This extends to the case of Bertrand duopoly the proposition of Collie and 
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de Meza (2003) that the country with the lowest cost firm will have the largest export tax or 
subsidy in absolute terms in the Nash equilibrium under Cournot duopoly. It also suggests a 
general principle that the country with lowest cost firm will have the greatest incentive to 
intervene in international trade. 
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Appendix: Cournot Duopoly with Product Differentiation 
The appendix generalises the well known results for Cournot duopoly in Brander and 
Spencer (1985) by introducing differentiated products to allow a comparison with the results 
under Bertrand duopoly. The firms face the inverse demand functions in (2) and set outputs to 
maximise profits in (3). Assuming an interior solution, it is straightforward to show that the 
Cournot equilibrium outputs are: 
 ( ) ( )1 2 , 1,2i j i i i j j jy c e c e i j j iH β α γ α⎡ ⎤= − − − − − = ≠⎣ ⎦  (A1) 
Substituting the Cournot equilibrium outputs into the demand functions in (2) yields the 
Cournot equilibrium prices: 
 ( ) ( )2ii i i j i i i j j jp c e c e c eHβ β α γ α⎡ ⎤= + + − − − − −⎣ ⎦  (A2) 
The maximum-revenue export tax under Cournot duopoly is obtained by solving (6) using 
(A1). Assuming an interior solution, this yields (the superscript C denotes the Cournot 
equilibrium and the R denotes maximum-revenue): 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 2
1 2 0
2 4
CR He y c cβ α γ αβ β= = − − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (A3) 
The maximum-revenue export tax is positive if exports are positive, 1 0y > , which 
implies that the expression in square brackets is positive. The maximum-revenue export tax is 
decreasing in the costs of the home firm and increasing in the costs of the foreign firm, as in 
the Bertrand case. 
The optimum-welfare export tax under Cournot duopoly is obtained by solving (10) using 
(A1) and (A2). Assuming an interior solution, this yields: 
 ( ) ( )2 21 1 2 1 1 2 2
2 2
2 0
2 4
CWe y c c
G
γ γ β α γ αβ β
−= = − − − <⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (A4) 
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The optimum-welfare export tax is negative (an export subsidy) as in Brander and 
Spencer (1985). The positive profit-shifting effect of the export subsidy outweighs the 
negative terms of trade effect under Cournot duopoly. 
The maximum-revenue export tax, which is positive, is obviously algebraically larger 
than the optimum-welfare export tax, which is negative. Therefore, to compare the two 
policies, the difference in the absolute size of maximum-revenue export tax and the optimum-
welfare export tax is, using (A3) and (A4): 
 ( ) ( )1 1 2 1 1 2 2
2
2 0
2
CR CW Fe e c c
G
β α γ αβ− = − − − >⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (A5) 
This is clearly positive, which leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition A1: The maximum-revenue export tax exceeds the optimum-welfare export 
tax under Cournot duopoly both in terms of its algebraic and its absolute value. 
Now consider the Nash equilibrium in export taxes. Solving (14) for the Nash 
equilibrium export taxes yields: 
 ( )( ) ( )2 2 2 24 2 02CNi i i i j je y c cγ γ β γ α βγ αβ− − ⎡ ⎤= = − − − − <⎣ ⎦∆  (A6) 
The Nash equilibrium export taxes are negative (export subsidies) under Cournot 
duopoly as in Brander and Spencer (1985). Comparing the absolute sizes of the export taxes 
of the two countries yields: 
 ( )21 2 2 12 24 2CN CNe e c c
γ
β βγ γ− = −− −  (A7) 
If the home firm has the lowest costs, 1 2c c< , then the home government will give the 
largest export subsidy in the Nash equilibrium in export subsidies, 1 2
CN CNe e>  and vice versa. 
This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition A2: The country with the lowest cost firm gives the largest export subsidy in 
the Nash equilibrium in export subsidies under Cournot duopoly. 
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As in de Meza (1986) and Collie and de Meza (2003), the export subsidy of the country 
with the lowest cost firms is larger than the export subsidy of the other country. The country 
with the low cost firm intervenes most in international trade whether it uses an export subsidy 
or an export tax. 
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